Iraq News Now

A Deadly Game of Chicken in Iraq and Lebanon

A Deadly Game of Chicken in Iraq and Lebanon
A Deadly Game of Chicken in Iraq and Lebanon

2019-11-20 00:00:00 - Source: Iraq News

The popular revolts in Iraq and Lebanon may be against different governments, but they represent a linked challenge to despotism and regime violence in the Arab world. And both share a central element: They are quintessential showdowns. Because the regimes refuse to consider incremental reform, the only way forward is to win. Defeat, for either side, will be absolute. Gradual reform might be the best theoretical outcome for these troubled states, but, alas, it isn’t on offer.

To that end, demonstrators have put their lives on the line for months on end to demand change. It’s a risky move. They’re making it impossible for the ruling clique to continue its extractive rule, leaving it with only two choices: destroy the demonstrations, or change their ways. But the demonstrators are using the only method available, short of resorting to an armed rebellion or a coup, to resist predatory regimes that foreclose any reasonable attempt at incremental or democratic reform.

In both cases, the popular movements have internalized some of the lessons of the Arab revolts that came before: Issue concrete demands, pay attention to the national political narrative, try to persuade the wider public, and innovate tactics in order to maintain momentum. (Unfortunately, they’re less clear on the benefits of naming leaders and contesting hard-power institutions.)

Regimes have studied the other revolts too, and as a result have opted to use force from the get-go—in Iraq’s case, lethal force. If the protests subside or fracture, the ruling authorities will use all the tools at their disposal to destroy them.

The zero-sum nature of the revolts stems from the recalcitrance of the regimes. They are unable to reform even slightly, because their entire system is built around extraction, rather than governance. Traditionally, even a corrupt regime benefits from economic growth—there’s more to steal. But the regimes in Iraq and Lebanon have opted to rely on mainline extortion and Ponzi schemes. Even disruption and collapse that harm the population can benefit the rulers.

The governors no longer share common interests with the governed. That disconnect fuels the popular desire for a radical overhaul of the system. Incremental reform is no longer enough; even if the regimes were willing to entertain a marginal reshuffle, it would only buy them time—the systems in their current configurations are too broken to govern. That disconnect also explains the passion and scope of the popular mobilization: Much of the population has realized that catastrophe looms, and they have little left to lose.

This fall, I spent a few weeks in Iraq and Lebanon conducting interviews about rights and citizenship for a research project. The people I met in Baghdad in the week before the protests, who came from a great diversity of backgrounds, weren’t planning a revolution, but they had given up on the government. They had come to the conclusion that no one in power was going to help them in the slightest.





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