Israel’s divide and rule: Iran and Iraq
The recent meeting of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Arab Gulf leaders at the Warsaw conference has opened the door to
speculation about another state in the region, Iraq.
Israel, like many other countries, has had a love-hate view
of Iran and Iraq over the years.
Like other countries, Israel has never managed to befriend
both at the same time. Indeed, others have sought to promote conflict between
Iran and Iraq to assist in establishing a regional balance.
Israel finds favor in this policy of strategy of “divide and
rule,” because so long as Israel’s adversaries are engaged in a conflict with
others, Israel is usually ignored as a target.
Israel and Iran are at loggerheads, so it won’t come as a
surprise that Israel should try to befriend Iraq.
It is already known that Israel and the Kurds have a good
working relationship, and share mutual interests about the fate of Syria. But
as with all other Arab states, having a good working relationship – be it economic
or even weapons sales – doesn’t mean they will recognize Israel as the Jewish
national homeland or even agree to formal diplomatic relations. These states
have little intention of making peace a reality.
It was recently revealed that several Iraqi delegations
visited Israel in 2018 and 2019. But it would be too optimistic to read too
much into these meetings regarding the future of Iraqi-Israeli relations.
Formal diplomatic ties – aka a peace treaty with Iraq –
remain very far away. This is not the least because there is a strong Iranian
Shiite influence in the government of Baghdad, and Tehran has come to dominate
many areas of Iraq through its proxy Shiite militias ever since Saddam’s
downfall.
This doesn’t prevent influential Sunni and Shiite Iranian
figures, including sitting members of parliament, from traveling to Jerusalem,
often telling their colleagues that the purpose is to make a pilgrimage to the
sites holy to Islam.
It would be delusional for any Israeli authority to think
that this is not in reality the true reason. There is a tendency for Israelis –
because they would like to be at peace with their neighbors – to jump to quick
conclusions and try to force an issue that might need to wait for the next
generation.
Experience has already shown that decades of negotiations
have cast doubts on the concessions required for what turns out to be a false
peace.
The 40-year peace between Israel and Egypt is very cold. And
peace ties with Jordan are at a rough spot, following Amman’s refusal to renew
part of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty that allows Israel to lease two
small areas of land: Naharayim in the northern Jordan Valley, and Ghamr in the
South.
Immediately after the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein in 2003, dozens of Iraqi parliamentarians visited Israel, including
Iraqi MP Mithal Alusi. But a short while later, he was kicked out of parliament,
and his two children were murdered. So nothing has come of that since.
It is evident that Arab states in the Middle East and Arab Gulf are only interested in making peace, or even just trading with
Israel, when they are in distress, having learned how to acquire Israeli aid
through empty promises of future peaceful relations.
The examples of this abound. In the 1980s, the Lebanese
Christians sold Israel the illusion of a future peace that would be made
possible once the Palestinian terrorist organizations had been expelled from
Lebanon. This, among other things, led to the outbreak of the 1982 First
Lebanon War, and the outcome of that misadventure is well-known.
Diplomatic relations between Israel and Iraq are light years
away. In my opinion, the visit by Iraqi officials to Israel was focused on the
topic of Syria in the hope of getting Israeli aid, or at least support, in
return for hollow promises of a future peace and diplomatic relations.
And the visiting officials paid the same kind of lip service
as was paid by the Lebanese Christians in the 1980s, and most recently by the
Syrian opposition.
The option known as “divide and rule” would see Israel
respond in a way to keep Arab states and non-state actors in conflict and war
with each other.