Iraq News Now

As US-Iran tensions

rise, America’s sway over its allies is falling. Last week, Major General

Christopher Ghika, the British officer second in command of anti ISIS forces in

Iraq and Syria, publicly contradicted the rationale behind American

troop build-ups in the region. US Central Command was quick to rebuff Ghika,

but Britain’s Ministry of Defence supported him.
Other

NATO allies, too, are balking at confrontation with Iran. Spain

has withdrawn a frigate from the American-led, Gulf-bound carrier group.

Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, has

called for ‘maximum restraint’. If there is to be a third Gulf War, the US

might find itself with fewer friends than in the last.
Is

this a crisis of American leadership, or of European loyalty to the Atlantic

alliance? Donald Trump has butted heads with Britain, France and Germany over

Iran before, but he may need them should hostilities break out. Meanwhile,

rival powers are exploiting the US-Europe split to substitute their own

leadership and advance their own interests. When the United States left the

‘Iran Deal’, it left Western Europe orphaned. Europe had supported the deal,

hoping to avoid war and keep Iran in the global oil market. Now, within the America-less

JCPOA bloc, Russia’s growing energy influence on Europe, and China’s economic

influence, threaten to eclipse Western powers’ influence on events in the

region.
China

has a ‘soft-power’ interest in reviving the Iran Deal and

avoiding war in the Persian Gulf. China likes to promotes

itself as a ‘responsible great

power’, primarily interested in stability and economic

growth. Despite internal repression, and some external subterfuge too, China

wants to be seen as a steady hand in international affairs. It is uninterested

in ‘regime change’, at home or abroad. Its partners can make

agreements with a one-party state without worrying that, four

years later, a new administration might renege. It

also wants a supply of cheap oil.
Russia’s

interest in Iran is rather different. The status quo does not suit Russia,

which remains insecure about its great-power status. For Moscow, fomenting

chaos is a cheap way of reasserting its role of preeminence in global affairs —

and raising the price of oil.
Russia’s

regional Middle East policy finds common cause with Iran. Both Russia and Iran

wish to curb American influence in the Middle East, an easier task since the

Obama-era abandonment of American hegemony in the region. The Islamic

Republic’s proxies look to undermine the Sunni-Arab dominance of the region,

which is backed, of course, by the United States. While Iran builds military

bases in Syria, Russia has used Iranian airbases to conduct the bombing campaigns

that preserved the rule of Russia’s historic client, Bashar al-Assad.
The

Syrian alliance is part of a wider military partnership between Russia and

Iran. Earlier this year, the two countries announced plans for joint naval

exercises on the Caspian Sea, reprising the war games of 2015 and 2017. Iran is

a market for Russian arms. Russia delivered the S-300 missile defense system to

Iran shortly after the implementation of the JCPOA in 2016, though a later, $10

billion deal on fighter jets, stalled. If American-led sanctions on Iran are

lifted, that market will expand, as the Iranian regime will have more cash.
For

most countries, the primary financial importance of Iran lies in its oil.

Washington’s oil embargo is an economic and political gift. Russia benefits

from a constricted global energy supply, which raises the prices of its own

exports. Moreover, European states had hoped that normalized relations between

Iran and the West would allow themselves to substitute Russian energy for

Iranian, without the complications of US-imposed sanctions. With Iran’s exports

off the market, Russia will continue to exert its leverage over the European

continent. The NordStream II pipeline, which continues to move forward despite

American objections, may be the surest sign of European resignation over their

continued dependence on Russian gas.
The American embargo

is far less amenable to China, now the world’s largest importer of

crude oil. Prior to the reimposition of sanctions, China spent $15 billion

a day on Iranian oil. China has also invested heavily in Iranian energy

supplies, and Iran is an important overland energy node in the Silk Road

Economic Belt. According to the American Enterprise Institute, China invested

at least $48.6 billion in purchases and contracts in Iran, the majority of

which was related to energy or transportation.
Yet

China has decided to comply with the new sanctions regime. Though there was

a Chinese purchasing binge prior to the waiver deadline, the top

state-owned oil refiners, Sinopec and the China National Petroleum Corporation

(CNPC), decided to cease importing Iranian oil, despite the hundreds of

billions of dollars they have invested in Iranian oil fields.
Sinopec’s

and CNPC’s moves demonstrate an unwillingness, at this point, to confront the

United States. Sanctions do have an effect; both CNPC and Sinopec would worry

about their access to international finance, should they run askance of

American sanctions law. Rather than run that risk, it is better for

now to wait and see. Having stockpiled Iranian oil, China has some

breathing room to monitor developments.
The

outcome of the US-Iran standoff is unclear. It is also unclear whether

America’s NATO allies would support military action against Iran. Meanwhile,

there are risks for both Russia and China in being too eager to capitalize on

these foundering relations. But there are also great opportunities for Russia

and China, both economically and politically. And should tensions continue to

rise, they may not need to wait long for such opportunities to present

themselves.