Iraq News Now

Less than a year after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-15 Eagle fighter-bombers crossed through Lebanese and Syrian airspace on a flight to western Iraq, where they reportedly scanned the desert for mobile Scud missile launchers. In a formal complaint to the United Nations, Iraq claimed that four Israeli F-15s participated in the mission. According to the letter, the F-15s passed over Syrian airspace and “flying at a low altitude, crossed the northwest border of Iraq” before ascending to 20,000 feet over the Al-Qaim and Al-Walid border regions and returning home. It was a daring mission that conclusively demonstrated the long reach of the IAF.

Thirty-one years later, Israeli military aircraft are still operating in this area, this time in search of a different enemy.

On Nov. 8, an airstrike struck a convoy of trucks crossing from Iraq into Syria near Al-Qaim. Israeli Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi later confirmed Israel’s involvement when he said Israeli warplanes had hit “specific targets” in a convoy “passing from Iraq to Syria.”

Kochavi credited military and intelligence with giving the IAF the ability to strike with such precision. Without these capabilities, he stressed, Israel “could have not known a few weeks ago about the Syrian convoy passing from Iraq to Syria. We could have not known what was in it, and we could have not known that out of 25 trucks, that was the truck. Truck No. 8 is the truck with the weapons.”

That lone vehicle was determined by “perfect intelligence” to contain Iranian weaponry. Initial reports after the attack suggested it killed 14 members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and allied militiamen. The arms were destined for Iran-backed militias in Syria’s eastern Deir ez-Zor province.

Kochavi also emphasized that the Israeli jets “needed to evade surface-to-air missiles” and pointed out that “there are operations where they fire between 30 to 40” and sometimes even 70 of those missiles. He was most likely alluding to IAF operations conducted in Syria that Syrian forces often try, invariably in vain, to hinder by firing large quantities of their antiquated air defense missiles, such as the vintage S-200.

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IAF jets often use air-launched standoff munitions fired from outside of Syrian airspace to ensure the safety of their pilots and planes. Syria repeatedly claims that its air defenses intercept large numbers of these incoming missiles. Using standoff munitions against a mobile target such as a convoy is significantly more difficult than destroying a fixed target for obvious reasons.

In Iraq, it’s a different story. Iraq’s air defenses are extremely limited, consisting primarily of 48 Russian-built medium-range Pantsir-S1 systems that don’t seem to have been deployed in areas that could potentially disrupt IAF operations over the Iraqi-Syrian border regions. Baghdad would not likely attempt to interfere with these strikes since Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its prowess in swiftly destroying such systems.

Turkey’s recent operation simultaneously targeted Kurdish groups in northern Syria and Iraq and demonstrated the different nature of these two environments for air campaigns. The Turkish Air Force did not fly any of its F-16s into Syrian airspace, instead using precision-guided air-to-surface munitions, which take on average nine minutes to hit their targets. On the other hand, it did not feel the need to exercise such caution when operating inside Iraqi airspace, which it has repeatedly penetrated to bomb the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) group.

In 2019, a series of Israeli strikes hit targets belonging to Iran-backed militias inside Iraq. The IAF hadn’t launched a strike as deep inside that country since the daring June 1981 raid against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Baghdad. It’s unclear if Israel used jets, drones, or a combination of both, for these missions. Either way, they demonstrated how the IAF could expand its Syria campaign into Iraq.

These strikes are part of a decade-old IAF campaign, primarily focused on Syria, to interdict and destroy Iranian armaments before they are supplied to Tehran’s proxies and deny Iran a significant military foothold in Syria. The campaign, part of the country’s shadow war with Iran, is often dubbed a “war between wars.”

The IAF’s reach and ability to strike specific targets and even targets of opportunity with precision is only likely to grow exponentially in the coming years. Israel recently tasked its drone industry with developing unmanned systems with greater range and stealth. According to one source, it already operates drones that enable it “to perform long-range pinpoint attacks on targets all over the Middle East.”

At a recent graduation ceremony for drone pilots, Israeli Artillery commander Brig.-Gen. Neri Horovitz emphasized the importance of drones for the Israeli military, noting that “In nearly every operational event, whether offensive or defensive, a drone is involved.”

It’s conceivable that Israel could, if it doesn’t already, have stealthy armed drones of various kinds discreetly loitering over strategically important regions like Al-Qaim for hours, or even days, at a time, waiting for the opportunity to pounce on enemy targets.

The IAF’s capabilities and reach have undoubtedly come a long way since that regional roundtrip 31 years ago.