Can Lebanon's new government fix a broken nation?

Lebanon finally has a new government. Last month, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s cabinet easily passed a confidence vote in parliament, gaining approval from 95 lawmakers out of 128. 

But it must now confront multifaceted challenges that hinge on several critical factors, each interlinked and fraught with complexity. 

It is legitimate to wonder whether someone like Salam, the former president of the International Court of Justice, who has been away from the country for two decades and has mainly dealt with international law and diplomacy, will be up to the task - especially since the main political forces responsible for Lebanon’s collapse are well-represented in his new government.

Once again, Saudi Arabia, France and the US heavily interfered in the process, which ended two years of institutional and political paralysis in Lebanon.

This is not a heartening factor, but at least for now, Lebanon’s institutions have been re-established with a new president and government.

After the hard blows inflicted by Israel in recent months, Hezbollah is considered to be heavily weakened, and thus less capable of influencing the national political agenda in the way it has over the past two decades. But some caution here would be advisable, especially after the impressive popular mobilisation that Hezbollah displayed at the massively attended funeral of Hassan Nasrallah. 

The Lebanese movement might have been weakened militarily, its leadership erased - but politically speaking, it seems to be alive and kicking.

Transcending divisions

Above all else, Lebanon needs a common political vision for its future - and in order to achieve this, its political establishment must transcend its diehard sectarian divisions. This is a daunting obstacle for a country whose power-sharing system inevitably leads to political gridlock. 

Salam's government, like previous ones, must navigate deep-seated divisions among factions and other confessional minorities. In this framework, a basic consensus on the most urgent reforms would be an essential display of common sense; a true win-win. 

Unfortunately, the country’s tragic history suggests that this aim is elusive, given conflicting interests that cannot be put aside, along with the influence of global and regional powers who cannot stop meddling in Lebanese politics.

Lebanon's political elites have consistently prioritised self-interest over reform, and external actors might lack the leverage or will to enforce change

Managing Lebanon’s economic crisis is the immediate priority. According to the World Bank, Lebanon has been gripped by one of the worst economic crises in modern history. Its currency has collapsed and the banking sector, which is insolvent, needs drastic reforms. 

The path to recovery is well-known: restructuring banks, unifying exchange rates, and securing support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But IMF bailouts require reforms like austerity measures and capital control laws, which could provoke a backlash from an already highly distressed population. 

According to the IMF policies in the past decades, subsidies should be removed and social safety nets progressively phased out - but such policies should be paired with targeted aid to mitigate the associated unrest. Will this government be capable of implementing such a programme, and where will the money to avoid unrest come from? 

In such a context, will a quiet gentleman like Salam be able to keep at bay the numerous sharks that populate Lebanese politics? Or would other, more assertive personalities be a better fit for this role?

Trust undermined 

These questions raise two critical issues regarding the struggle against corruption and governance reforms. So far, Lebanon’s endemic corruption has undermined trust and effectiveness for any reform effort. 

No impactful and lasting reforms will be possible without judicial independence, public institutional audits, and the recovery of stolen assets. These targets, while vital, face huge resistance from entrenched kleptocratic elites who, sadly, are far too well represented even in this new government.

Salam also faces deep public anger. He must address widespread demands for accountability, while averting civil unrest exacerbated by unemployment and poverty, with 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line.

This is complicated by a precarious security situation, including Israel’s undermining of the ceasefire with Hezbollah; the highly uncertain state of affairs in Syria; and internal sectarian strife, not to mention American-Israeli plans for potential ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the West Bank, which could further fuel anger and resentment.

International support is vital for Lebanon’s renaissance, combined with strong pressure to force long-awaited reforms. But international pressure often does not work as it should. Lebanon’s political elites have a consummate ability to bamboozle and exasperate all external interlocutors.

Even the formation of this latest government did not skip this step. Weeks after the US on 7 February said Hezbollah’s presence in the new cabinet was a red line for Washington, the new government was approved with Hezbollah ministers. Western and Gulf aid to Lebanon, after bad experiences in the past, are now firmly tied to reforms, and geopolitical tensions complicate this process.

Historical precedent suggests that a breakthrough is unlikely. Lebanon’s political elites have consistently prioritised self-interest over reform, and external actors might lack the leverage or the will to enforce change. Structural obstacles, entrenched corruption, and geopolitical fragmentation create a daunting landscape. 

The coming months will determine whether Salam can be a game changer - or whether the country is destined to spiral further into chaos.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.