Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani meets with U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2020. Photo: The White House
Michael Rubin | Kurdistan Times
Many Iraqi Kurds reacted positively to Iraqi Kurdistan Regional President Nechirvan Barzani’s meeting with U.S. President Trump in Davos, and especially with the Iraqi Kurdish flag draped alongside the American flag in the background. Many Kurds suggest that this meeting, alongside several other recent occurrences—the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker’s visit to Erbil and snub of authorities in Baghdad during a recent swing through the Middle East; political uncertainty in Baghdad; and the Iraqi parliament’s non-binding vote to demand U.S. forces’ ouster—suggests that Washington is reconsidering its position with regard to Iraqi Kurdistan’s role in Iraq and perhaps its future independence.
Indeed, many Iraqi Kurds remain disappointed in the United States for its failure to support the September 2017 independence referendum. Many Kurds remain understand why Washington seemingly sided with their enemies Iran against the Iraqi Kurds, and stood aside as the Iraqi army and Iranian-controlled Shi’ite militias took huge chunks of territory controlled by Iraqi Kurdistan.
The reality is more complex than outlets such as Masrour Barzani’s Bas News or Kurdistan24 depicted. For both Washington and Baghdad, the issue was less the idea of a referendum and more its application to disputed territories. Had the referendum been limited to the Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaimani governorates, Kurdistan might have been an independent state today. Prior to the referendum, all elements of the U.S. government—the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and intelligence community—warned the Kurdistan Regional Government against moving forward. The Barzani family, however, chose to listen only to those with whom it did business—men like Peter Galbraith and Zalmay Khalilzad. The Barzanis confused friendship with a willingness to tell them what they wanted to hear.
Massoud Barzani (R) with elder son Masrour. Photo: Barzani’s FB
Behind-the-scenes, U.S. Special Envoy Brett McGurk proposed to support a referendum if it was delayed two years, but Masrour and father Massoud, the drivers of the referendum’s timing, remained inflexible. The issue was not that McGurk was anti-Kurd or pro-Shi’iite. To dismiss opponents as anti-Kurd historically does not serve Kurds well. Rather, the problem was recognition that independence would likely lead Kurdistan to disaster. As I argued in a recent edited collection by Vera Eccarius–Kelly and Michael Gunter, Turkey could support Iraqi Kurdish independence, but only so long as it would be the Kurdish equivalent of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. That seems to be a bargain the Barzanis have been willing to make, as they transform Iraqi Kurdistan into a Turkish economic colony.
The broader problem, however, is Iran. Fearing the precedent Kurdish independence could have upon its own integrity, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would do its best to undermine if not occupy Iraqi Kurdistan. The peshmerga, for all its honor in Kurdish society, would be unable to overcome them without sustained U.S. military assistance. Americans may sympathize with the Kurds, but Erbil profoundly misreads the United States if they believe there is any willingness to fight a war with the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of Kurdish independence. (If the Islamic Republic first collapses under its own weight, all bets are off, and the U.S. position could change in favor of independence). Too often, it seems, Kurdish supporters prioritize the emotional case for independence over the impediments about which diplomats worry.
Of course, fear of Iranian efforts to undermine Kurdish independence is only one problem among many advocates of Kurdish independence face. Kurds like to depict a divorce between Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan as akin to that between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Economically and politically, however, the situation is more akin to Sudan and South Sudan. Oil wealth and political greed compounded tribal and political divisions leading South Sudan into state failure. Nor does oil wealth matter when a landlocked country is at its neighbors’ economic mercy.
Kurdish authorities tell anyone who will listen that Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who diverts disproportionate contracts and revenue to Kurdish politicians, is not the problem but rather the system in Baghdad. Nechirvan, Masrour, and Massoud Barzani uncle Hoshyar Zebari argue for a divorce between Baghdad and Erbil, the latter in conjunction with Sunni Arab regions, they do not explain how surrendering Baghdad to militiamen answering to Tehran’s call will make Iraqi Kurdistan safe, nor would it force Baghdad to surrender its own claims to disputed regions. That does not mean that Erbil must forever be in an unhappy marriage with Baghdad, but ultimately Iraqi Kurdistan’s security depends upon Kurds being a moderating force in Baghdad rather than exacerbating political conflict to make a U.S. alliance with Erbil look like the only realistic option.
Finally, economics matter. As Kurds know well, much of the money for their salaries come from Baghdad, hence the difficulties when Baghdad withholds the payments. This suggests Kurdish oil is not enough to sustain the region. The same is even more true for al-Anbar, Salahuddin, and Ninewa, regions which remain fully dependent upon Baghdad for their salaries. A Kurdish divorce and a Sunni Regional Government might seem attractive for those whose experience in Iraq rests mostly with one constituent group or their lobbyists, but there is a reason why magic formulas seldom work.
Here are the points: Kurdish authorities can point to political uncertainty in Baghdad and say the situation there bolsters the case for Kurdish separatism. Put aside the fact that the same undercurrents against corruption and unaccountable government could apply just as easily to Iraqi Kurdistan as Iraq proper, and unrest may not bypass Kurdistan. But, until Erbil resolves its own political divisions—Masrour Barzani vs. Lahur Talabani, for example, if not Masrour vs. Nechirvan—and unless Erbil can answer how an independent Kurdistan will resist Iranian aggression, be economically viable, and live alongside the remainder of Iraq without territorial disputes that could devolve quickly into military conflict, the arguments for Kurdish independence will fall flat, if not among Kurds themselves than among the international patrons whom they seek to convince. Offers of new American bases in Iraqi Kurdistan will not change that.
It is time for Nechirvan and Masrour to understand what their uncle and father never did: There are no shortcuts to Kurdish aspirations. They first must put their own house in order.
Michael Rubin is a former Pentagon official whose major research areas are the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy. He is author of “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter, 2014). He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute AEI. His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society. Read more by Michael Rubin.
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The article first published at Kurdistan Times.
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