Peshmerga reforms necessary in order to fight resurgent ISIS: General

The war against the Islamic State (ISIS) was a turning point for the Peshmerga forces. The Kurdish forces are famed for their guerilla skills honed by decades of revolution in their mountains, but with ISIS they faced a superior-armed group and in terrain that was unfamiliar. They also had an extraordinary opportunity as they forged relationships with militaries of the 79-member global coalition created to fight the extremist group. In December 2017, the Ministry of Peshmerga formed a committee to start ambitious reforms. British, American, and German allies have come on board, backing the 35-step reform plan.

Staff Brigadier General Hazhar Omer Ismail, Director of Coordination and Public Relations in the Ministry of Peshmerga, is a member of that committee. In an interview on April 3, he explained the reform process and progress. 

The following is a translated version of his interview that has been edited for clarity and length. 

Rudaw: How are the reforms progressing so far? 

Staff Brigadier General Hazhar Omer Ismail:  You know that reforms in a military are a continuous process. It is necessary for a military or Ministry of Defense to have reforms every now and then for things to progress and to fill gaps. However, for us, it is a new process frankly. However, it is an important process, strategic and long-term. 

Our project consists of 35 projects. There are important points in the project, such as rewriting the security strategy of the Kurdistan

Region. You know that every country needs to have a national security strategy. Iraq has national security strategy, but unfortunately, when it updated it in 2016, and even before, it makes no mention of the role of Peshmerga Forces and the Kurdistan Region. That is why, we have been given the right and we have given ourselves the right, to write the security strategy of the Kurdistan Region. 

Writing the security strategy of Kurdistan Region requires the [participation] of other parties, such as the Regional Government, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, the Security Council, Ministry of Planning, even the Ministry of Health, and all other parties. That is why we set out to initially write the defense strategy of the Ministry of Peshmerga. This is one of the thirteen points, in addition to rewriting the Operating Concept, digitalizing Peshmerga salaries, relations between the Peshmerga Ministry and the Iraqi Defense Ministry, as well as reviewing the laws and terms of reference of the Ministry of Peshmerga. We found it good for these projects to be given a priority. 

Very good work has been done. The projects have been written down. However, there still is work remaining as they are long-term projects. 

Is Britain more involved than other countries in the reform project?

All the three countries… America, Britain and Germany played an important role in supporting Peshmerga Forces, whether in the fight against Daesh [ISIS] or in this process. It is true that Britain, in the writing of the ideas, has been very helpful to the board and directorate of reforms. Because implementing the reform project of Peshmerga requires a lot of logistics, weapons, ammunition, and so on, America is the most helpful in this aspect to the Ministry of Peshmerga. 

In this reform project, the gaps need to be identified. We have many gaps. According to the Iraqi constitution, the Ministry of Peshmerga is part of the Iraqi defense apparatus.  Unfortunately, however, ever since the Iraqi constitution was adopted, we are still waiting for our entitlements from the Iraqi federal government. We haven’t got them as of now in terms of budget, weapons, ammunition, [training] courses, in all aspects. The Iraqi government as of now hasn’t shouldered its responsibility and has violated the Iraqi constitution. It hasn’t supported the Peshmerga forces. 

Back in the days we had negotiations with the Iraqi federal government and Iraqi Ministry of Defense, in the years 2006 and 2007, to reach an agreement for Peshmerga forces to become part of the Iraqi defense apparatus, to become Kurdistan Region Guards, in parenthesis Peshmerga Forces. An agreement was made with the supervision of the Coalition forces, especially America. All sides signed it. We have these documents. However, when it was given to then-Prime Minister Maliki, he violated it, ignored it, and it was never implemented. 

That is why, from then up to now, we have many gaps. The Kurdistan Regional Government tries a lot to provide the Ministry of

Peshmerga with some budget. The budget that was allocated to the Ministry of Peshmerga was very little. The allocated budget would be cut from other service ministries, such as the [Ministries of] Municipalities, Health, Higher Education or Education so that a part of the Peshmerga budget is provided that would only be for salaries, daily expenses or bonuses. However, we have never had a budget for development, arming, equipping, and housing… We haven’t had this up to now. 

What we have had was very little. For example, if we were to compare the salary of the Peshmerga to Iraqi soldiers, a normal Iraqi soldier receives more than one million Iraqi dinars. Peshmerga received about 500,000 ($420 monthly), meaning half of the salary of an Iraqi soldier. However, if we were to look at the performance of the Peshmerga, its performance is much better than the performance of an Iraqi soldier. We all saw that in 2014 – four divisions of the Iraqi Army, without a fight, without a single shot, in one day, threw down all their weapons, collapsed, left their bases and fled to their homes. However, the Peshmerga forces then, when they received half a salary every three or four months, had the readiness to fight and sacrifice their life for their nation. 

It is true that the budget, salary, equipment and logistical necessities are very important for an army. Morale and allegiance are more important. Fortunately, Peshmerga morale has always been high. Their loyalty to the homeland is very high. Another strong point of the Peshmerga, especially for the Kurdistan Region, is the strong relation between the populace of Kurdistan and the security forces, especially Peshmerga and Asayesh. There is trust. However, if we look at the Iraqi security forces, they might be breached. The people might not trust them. 

That is why unfortunately in the past we didn’t have the budget to develop our forces. America has tried filling some of these gaps in the past years for the Peshmerga forces. Germany has also had an important role in supporting Peshmerga forces, including training, advising, providing some arms and implementing some projects. 

As an example, in the fight against Daesh, Daesh used chemical weapons more than 20 times, but we didn’t have the capability to protect our Peshmerga. About 400 Peshmerga were injured due to Daesh chemical weapons. We didn’t have gas masks and some

other chemical materials. That is why we established the Chemical Defense Unit in the Ministry of Peshmerga. Germany was very helpful in this with regard to providing equipment and training. America too. Germany made some other projects too. For example, we had 10,000 injured in the fight against Daesh. Unfortunately we couldn’t treat them all in our hospitals. The Ministry of Peshmerga had no military hospital. I personally gave Germany a project. They approved it, thus establishing a Peshmerga hospital especially for treating Peshmerga and their families. 

Will the 68 billion dinars from Iraq help you get closer to the Iraqi Defense Ministry and Iraqi defense apparatus?

On paper, we are part of the Iraqi defense apparatus. But based on entitlements, we haven’t received our entitlements to be part of the Iraqi defense apparatus. For example, in the war against Daesh, Hashd al-Shaabi was founded. It is composed of about 60 Shiite groups. They all united [under the Popular Mobilization Forces], but have differing agendas. They were trained and supported in different places. For the war against Daesh, the federal government, in just a single day, legalized the force by sending a bill, the Hashd al-Shaabi Bill, to the parliament. However, we have been waiting for nearly 14 years for the Peshmerga Bill or Peshmerga entitlement to be placed in the Iraqi federal budget, but to no avail. 

For this year, the Iraqi federal government has decided to allocate 68 billion [dinars, $57 million] for the Ministry of Peshmerga. This might be half, even less than a quarter of the Peshmerga’s rights. Nevertheless, we deem it good for the relations to be built again. This will fill a gap for the Peshmerga. It won’t fill all of them, but it will fill a gap, although we haven’t received this money yet. 

Also, back then, from 2009 to 2014, we had joint forces in the disputed territories between Peshmerga forces, Iraqi forces, local police, and Asayesh. In Mosul, Kirkuk, and Diyala we had joint checkpoints, joint coordination centers and joint forces. However, with the arrival of Daesh, it took control of most of the disputed areas in Mosul, Diyala, Tikrit and other areas. Peshmerga forces went to Kirkuk. Joint forces no longer exist. If we were to look at the condition of the disputed territories, they are very bad. Daesh is about to re-emerge. Security conditions are bad. There are gaps between our forward defense line and Iraq’s forward defense line. Daesh is making use of that gap. Their terrorist activities have increased in the disputed territories, especially in Kirkuk, south of Kirkuk, Hamrin, Mosul and other areas. That is why it has become a popular demand. The people and the Coalition ask for joint forces to be re-established. We are of the opinion that the joint forces should be re-established until Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution is implemented. 

How have things progressed in the joint committees set up between Iraq’s Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Peshmerga? 

Two supreme committees in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Peshmerga have been established and a number of sub-committees. There has been one meeting of the supreme committee. The sub-committees have had their meetings too, to look into coordination and cooperation. There have been field surveys from Khanaqin to Shingal. We are waiting for the second meeting with the supreme committee of Iraq’s Ministry of Defense for things to go forward. 

We see that the Iraqi side is dragging its feet. They aren’t coming forward as they should. The field reports are ready. We are waiting for more meetings to reach an agreement. However, there is some slacking on the Iraqi side. 

There are rumors that there are a large number of ghost employees in the Ministry of Peshmerga, such as ghost Peshmerga. Will digitizing their salaries resolve this issue?

First, there is no evidence that the Ministry of Peshmerga has ghost employees. The working hours of Peshmerga are different from the Iraqi Army or another country’s army. A Peshmerga is always ready to sacrifice his life for Kurdistan. But Peshmerga are also humans. They have families. They need to live. If the salary is small or doesn’t exist monthly, then the Peshmerga will have to act like a reserve force. We might not be able to tell a Peshmerga to work 21 to 23 days in a month. We can’t impose that on them. Even being on duty requires necessities, food and expenses. The Peshmerga also needs to provide his family with food and services. Some of them have kids going to school. Some of them live in a rented house. That is why there has to be the chance for them to do other work to provide for themselves. Some people might think this means there are ghost Peshmerga, but no. This is the working system.

There might be ghost Peshmerga and this will resolve it to a great degree. It is an international system. The salary will go directly to the Peshmerga. Work has been done. As a test, we started with the directorate of reform. We hope in the future other directorates and units of Peshmerga do the same. The project will be easier if salaries and the Peshmerga budget are provided and given on time. 

Is there a deadline set for the reform projects?

This project is a long-term project. It might span five years or more. Some of the 35 projects are easy and can be done in a couple of months. Some others are long term and will take years. 

There is the feeling that progress on the reforms has been slow. Is it political or lack of human capital?

Quite the opposite. For example, Colonel Will Davies, the British advisor [to Peshmerga] and another British colonel in Baghdad have the same reform process for Iraqi security forces in Baghdad. Everyone, including Britain, America and the Coalition say that the Peshmerga reform project progresses much better and faster than the one in Baghdad. The work isn’t easy. It requires time, political

will. It requires the support of the parties and the Regional Government, without a doubt. It also requires capabilities. What we have seen is that there is strong political will. Even the KDP and PUK support this project through Units 70 and 80. In the future, if we have a new [Regional] government, then of course it will gain more momentum. I see that there is seriousness on all sides. 

How do these reforms help Peshmerga in the fight against ISIS and decreasing casualties?

After the war against Daesh, there was a need for After Action Review. We started this plan to study the shortcomings that we had in the fight against Daesh in every aspect, whether training, readiness, treating wounded Peshmerga, command and control and bases. In my opinion, this reform process of the Peshmerga will be very helpful for the readiness of the Peshmerga in the future to be better, for casualties to be less, and to counter our enemies. Daesh has indeed been defeated as a caliphate, but it and its ideology remains. 

The Peshmerga have been known as a guerilla force. How will these reforms change the identity of the Peshmerga?

The fight against Daesh and terrorist groups, urban fighting, suicide bombers, these are a new generation of fighting. It isn’t an easy fight. Peshmerga forces in the past had very good experience in mountainous and guerilla fighting. This fight, however, was new for the Peshmerga. Fortunately, with the passage of days in the fight against Daesh, the Peshmerga adapted to the fighting and learned the style. This type of fighting might be easier for us now than it was in its initial stages. 

Will these reforms focus on giving Peshmerga urban warfare training?

This reform covers all aspects. It is general, focused on the method of elevating the Peshmerga’s performance and what kind force we can have in the future, for the reserves, engineering, and military class to be developed.