Iraq Enters The Israel-Iran Proxy War
Iraq has become another front in the Israel-Iran proxy wars in
the Middle East. Last July, two suspected attacks were conducted against
Iran-allied militias, one in Amerli in Salahuddin governorate north of Baghdad
and the other against Camp Ashraf in Diyala governorate, which was previously
used by American troops. Israel has been worried that the militias' bases have
been serving as a repository for Iranian missiles that could be wielded against
it. In January 2019, during a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Adel
Abdul-Mahdi, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is reported to have
discussed the role of the militias in
housing Iranian missiles and hinted that the United States would not object if
Israel attacked the facilities.
The first attack resulted in the death of an Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, Abu Alfazl Sarabian, and several
Hezbollah and militias soldiers. The Iraqis were not sure about the source of
the attack while the Iranians considered the IRGC commander a martyr. From
Iran’s side, it would make sense to use the militias to deploy missiles in
Iraq; this would increase Tehran’s area of operations and enable it to
transport missiles to Syria and Lebanon. Its inventory of ballistic
missiles could put Riyadh—or even Tel Aviv—within range if launched from
Iraqi territory.
The other attack followed and targeted Camp Ashraf in Diyala
governorate, which was once used by the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, an organization
opposed to the Iranian regime. The base is closer to the Iranian border, making
it essential for the IRGC’s operations. It was interesting that these strikes
came less than two weeks after Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi ordered the
militias to be integrated entirely into the Iraqi security forces, a step seen
as lessening Iranian influence in the country. Soon after the issuance of
Abdul-Mahdi’s decree, many militias factions like Kataeb Hezbollah slammed it
and attributed the policy to the result of US and Saudi pressure. Other IMIS
factions, including those close to Iraqi Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani such as the
Abbas Combat Division, were obedient and quiet, following the orders of the
prime minister—as the commander in chief of the armed forces—without
resistance.
An attack on August 14 against a weapons depot in Baghdad was
also blamed on Israel. An Israeli imaging firm confirmed that the attack
on an IMIS camp south of Baghdad was carried out by Israeli aircraft; it
supported this claim by producing images of the attack. The Iraqi government
has remained silent and has not referred to Israel as the responsible party. In
fact, most of the government’s statements were verbal and did not hold anyone
directly accountable. This clearly exposes the volatile and enfeebled state of
the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi prime minister is weak as regards Iranian interests;
he has neither the power nor the will to act in more aggressive and vigorous
ways. This is perhaps due to his hidden connections with Iranian influence
circles inside the Iraqi government or simply because he lacks support from the
political and security sectors.
Still, the attacks indicate that Israel is looking to widen its
theater of confrontation with Iran to an unwitting Iraq that continues to
suffer from foreign interference. Such an Israeli attempt appears to be conducted
under the watchful–perhaps colluding–eye of the Trump Administration, which
considers itself to be an important player in Iraqi politics.