The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Damascus in just a matter of days was not entirely a surprise for Ankara.
The Syrian military had been offering little resistance, and senior Turkish officials had long seen Assad’s downfall as inevitable. However, no one predicted that the collapse of the Syrian government would happen so rapidly.
Turkish officials last month had only permitted a limited operation by Syrian armed opposition groups aligned with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to exert pressure on Assad and his Iranian allies.
Yet, they did not anticipate the sudden capture of Aleppo. The primary reasoning behind this operation was the repeated attacks by Syrian government forces on residential areas in Idlib, which regularly drove civilians toward the Turkish border.
The timing was also ripe. Russia was preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, while Hezbollah and Iran were focused on Israel.
Additionally, the United States was in a transitional period, with President-elect Donald Trump set to take office within a month. Ankara was considering a limited operation to secure the small but strategically important area of Tal Rifaat while HTS launched its offensive.
However, what began as a limited operation quickly escalated into a significant campaign, resulting in the capture of entire cities in just 11 days. This development has positioned Ankara as the most dominant force in Syria.
Since the offensive, Turkey has repeatedly called for dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition forces, emphasising the need to preserve the state’s institutional structure.
HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, has thus far maintained the Syrian government’s administrative framework, including its prime minister and state institutions, while pledging to respect all sects. He has extended overtures to Russia and allowed Christians and other minorities to remain in cities unharmed.
A pivotal role
Khaled Khoja, the former president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, believes Turkey has played a pivotal role from the outset of the operation.
“It’s a very sterile revolution, so to say,” Khoja told Middle East Eye. “From the launch of the operation to the local practices, Turkey’s influence is evident at every step.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in October famously said that "there would be soon good news" that would ensure the security of Turkey's southern borders.
Khoja credits Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and other senior officials with skillfully bringing Russia into the fold of a new Syria.
He notes that many of Jolani’s actions - such as establishing a transitional government and promoting national peace and reconciliation - mirror concepts the Syrian opposition had discussed in workshops involving Russian officials for years.
Ahmed al-Sharaa, more commonly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, in Damascus' Umayyad Mosque on 8 December (AFP)
"While Jolani is his own man, this operation clearly points to a mastermind behind the scenes," Khoja remarked.
For years, Turkey has worked to moderate HTS, leveraging its influence to rein in the group. Observers note that Jolani’s hard-line stance has softened gradually since the 2017 Astana Agreement, when Turkish forces first entered Idlib to enforce a ceasefire.
Can Acun, a regional expert at the Ankara-based SETA think tank, emphasises that Turkey has paid a heavy price over the years for being the only regional state to consistently back the Syrian opposition - both politically and economically.
According to Acun, Ankara has two main priorities in Syria: facilitating reconciliation among the various Syrian armed opposition groups operating across regions from Idlib to Deir Ezzor and assisting in the establishment of an interim government that represents all political factions in the country.
Acun highlights that Turkey has already created a governance model in northern Syria following its operations against the Islamic State group and Kurdish forces.
This model includes the Syrian Interim Government, the Syrian National Army, local governance based on assemblies, and an integrated local economy.
He believes Turkey can share this experience with a transitional government in post-Assad Syria. Turkish state institutions are also expected to play a direct role in supporting the transitional government in the near future.
“Maintaining existing institutions is essential,” Acun told MEE. “Turkey must establish a mechanism to support this process by providing technical capacity and addressing critical needs.”
Eyes on the SDF
Acun adds that a Damascus-centered transitional government will need to tackle key issues such as access to energy resources, water supplies and agricultural areas. Many of these resources, he notes, are controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria, which has been a significant factor in undermining Assad’s rule.
Khoja suggests that HTS could potentially negotiate with the SDF, which is dominated by Kurdish forces, for access to resources, such as fuel from oil fields near Deir Ezzor.
Acun said Turkey would not tolerate SDF control in key towns within Arab-majority areas. He suggested that Ankara could potentially launch military operations in near future to remove the SDF, which it considers a terror group due to ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), from the border regions, depending on the political climate.
Another critical issue for Turkey is the return of over 3 million Syrian refugees currently residing within its borders. Acun estimates that approximately 55 percent of these refugees hail from the Aleppo region, an industrial hub. Syrian officials recently announced that factories in Aleppo have begun reopening.
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“Logistical corridors connecting areas such as Tal Rifaat, Turkey’s Gaziantep and Aleppo have already been established, fostering economic integration,” Acun explained. “This could attract investment to support the return of Syrian refugees. However, it is unrealistic to expect all refugees to return. Some families who have adapted to life in Turkey, such as learning Turkish, may choose to stay.”
The return of refugees is expected to be gradual, influenced by socio-economic and security factors. Complete security must first be established, followed by reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. Turkey will likely play a leading role in coordinating these activities.
The remaining Syrian refugees in Turkey primarily come from regions such as Hama, Homs, and Manbij, cities that were captured by rebel forces during the recent offensive.
There is broad consensus that Syria will require extensive reconstruction. Khoja notes that calculations from 2017 estimated the need to rebuild 2 million homes and restore basic infrastructure, with costs projected to reach up to $360bn.
Acun believes that the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Gulf countries are likely to serve as key donors during this reconstruction phase, with Ankara coordinating and leading the efforts.
“Turkey’s non-governmental organizations have already launched rapid aid campaigns to support local initiatives,” Acun added. “The Syrian Interim Government, which was previously based in Idlib, has now shifted its operations to Aleppo.”
