Iraq News Now

The real dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, as

well as within Israel itself, no longer revolves around the end of the

“occupation” but around the future of eastern Jerusalem and Area C of Judea and

Samaria.

That’s because in January 1996, Israel vacated the West

Bank’s heavily-populated areas (areas A and B of the Oslo Accords) and gave control

to the Palestinian Authority. About 90% of Palestinians in the West Bank now

live under PA control in areas A and B.

This actualized Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s vision of

ending Israel’s control of Palestinian daily life without creating a full-fledged

Palestinian state. (Contrary to popular perception, Oslo did not commit Israel

to full-fledged Palestinian statehood; Rabin was unalterably opposed to that).

Alas, over the past 20 years, Israel has failed to

effectively administer Area C as its responsibility under the Oslo Accords,

until the status of the area is determined in direct negotiations between the

conflicting parties.

Instead, Israeli authorities have mostly stood limply by as

the PA moves aggressively to assert its dominance in critical C zones – with

the support of foreign actors (mainly European) who are hostile to Israel’s

present or future administration of these areas.

In a recently published study, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Gershon

Hacohen of the BESA Center bemoans the situation, warning that losing control

of Area C is dangerous. He argues – with professional and ideological passion –

that retention by Israel of most of Area C is in its vital, long-term national

interest.

Hacohen explains that Area C includes all Jewish localities

in Judea and Samaria, plus IDF bases, transportation arteries, vital

topographic sites and habitable empty spaces between the Jordan Valley and the

Jerusalem metropolis. These highly strategic and sparsely-populated lands are

of immense economic, communal, ecological and cultural importance, not to

mention their historical significance as the bedrock of the age-old Jewish

ancestral homeland.

Based on a very detailed military analysis, Hacohen argues

that the surrender of Area C to a potentially hostile Palestinian state would

make the defense of the Israeli hinterland virtually impossible. And it will be

impossible to ensure the demilitarization of such an entity. Attack tunnels and

torpedoes would proliferate Hezbollah-style.

He utterly dismisses the notion that Israel could safely

withdraw from Area C and easily re-conquer the territory if it became a base of

terrorism against Israel – as some generals on the Left have argued. This would

be a nightmare, and not a “cake-walk,” he says.

He also calls for massive Israeli home construction across

strategic parts of Area C, such as the Jerusalem-to-Jericho corridor, which

anchors Israel’s central East-West access route for the transfer of fighting

forces from the coastal plain to the Jordan Valley’s defensive line.

Hacohen further argues that the “friction” generated by the

presence of Israeli towns in Judea and Samaria is of great military value to

the IDF; it adds to the army’s ability to operate effectively in the

territories, not the opposite. The hybrid situation in which Israeli towns and

the IDF co-mingle in Area C with Palestinians is the preferred situation, he

writes. Ehud Barak’s concept of a neat division of territory with a fence in

the middle – “we’re here and they’re there” – is strategically unsound,

concludes Hacohen.

Whether one accepts Hacohen’s defense and diplomatic

conclusions or not, what emerges from his study, incontestably I think, is the

need to govern Area C much more broadly, effectively and fairly.

Key Civil Administration officials make it clear that Israel

is failing to do so. The lawlessness that currently exists in Area C does

serious, and in some cases, permanent damage to natural resources, the

environment and the quality of life for Israeli and Palestinians on both sides

of the Green Line. Moreover, by not tightly controlling Area C, Israel is

frittering away the strongest bargaining card that it has for future negotiations.

Real governance would mean preventing hostile, unauthorized,

out-of-control Palestinian building in zones that are critical to Israeli

interests – such as E-1, the Hebron Hills and the Jordan Valley – and

countering the interference of European governments, hostile UN agencies and

NGOs in such matters.

There is an entire world of European-funded agencies that

runs a constant legal battle in Israeli courts against any Israeli attempt to

enforce its governance in Area C. Take the endless court battles regarding Khan

al-Ahmar as an example.

These NGOs would be making a better investment in peace by

focusing on democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights in the PA

itself – in areas A and B, where only the most autocratic and corrupt rule

applies.

Broad and effective rule by Israel also means developing the

rotten-road infrastructure and rigorously policing the lawless roads of Area C:

a core matter that affects the quality of life of both Israelis and Palestinians.

At the same time, fair governance means allowing for

Palestinian civil and municipal development in an organized fashion in parts of

Area C that do not threaten Israeli interests – such as the approval of the

Kalkilya extension plan. (Unfortunately, the plan was torpedoed by the

Netanyahu government last year.)

In short, we need governance with direction and purpose,

meaning that Israel must administer Area C effectively and with much more

authority, whether it wishes to either hold the territory as an effective card

for future bargaining, or whether it intends to annex the lands to Israel.

It is often alleged that Israeli settlement in Judea and

Samaria is “gobbling-up” Palestinian lands in Area C. This is nonsense, as a

straightforward encounter with basic facts makes clear that most of Area C is

breathtakingly empty: the Judean desert, the northern Samarian desert and the

Jordan Valley. These precincts are mostly nature reserves, firing zones and

grazing grounds, amounting to more than half of the land in Area C (200,000 of

the 350,000 hectares, or 500,000 of 860,000 acres).

All Jewish and Arab inhabitation of Area C cover only about

40% of the land mass. That consists of about 200,000 Palestinians in 25 towns

and hundreds of unorganized hamlets, with homes sitting on 8% of the territory

and agriculture on another 25%. There are also 400,000 Israelis living in Area

C, and their settlements sit on only 2.5% of Area C (which means that their

population density is currently more than six times as much), with plans for

expansion to another 7%.

This means that there is room for both Israeli and

Palestinian populations to thrive in Area C, if it is administered with a firm

and wise hand.

For many years, some Israeli politicians have ignored the

necessity of rigorously governing Area C, because they figured that much of the

land would soon be negotiated away in peace talks with the Palestinians. The

same goes for eastern Jerusalem, which has failed until now to receive enough

Israeli investment and resources.

But even with the peace initiative of US President Donald

Trump at our doorstep, the likelihood of any Israeli-Palestinian accords

emerging soon are slim. As a result, Israel will likely have to rule eastern

Jerusalem (which it has annexed) and manage Area C (parts of which it may want

to annex) for the foreseeable future. It should do so diligently and

judiciously.