Border security should top Egypt priorities after Sudan, Libya turmoil
Following the eruption of protests in Sudan and the military
offensive in Libya, apprehensions of insecurity on Egypt’s western and southern
borders have started growing. It was no coincidence that both ousted Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir and commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA)
Khalifa Haftar visited Cairo as tensions reached their peak back home, in a
demonstration of where Egypt’s bets were placed at the time.
It is difficult to predict at this point how susceptible
Egypt is to a spillover of unrest. It is equally difficult to measure the
sustainability of Egypt’s current alliances with both Sudan and Libya.
Egypt’s support for Haftar is not a surprise as, since
launching Operation Dignity in 2014 in Benghazi, he has posed as the archenemy
of Islamist militias and the only one capable of curtailing the growing
influence of ISIS and similar groups. In fact, the kidnapping and beheading by
ISIS of 21 Coptic Egyptian workers in Libya in 2015 was seen by many as
retaliation for Egypt’s support for Haftar. Meanwhile, the executive authority
in Tripoli, which sees Haftar’s offensive as a “coup,” as Libyan Prime Minister
Fayez al-Sarraj put it, is recognized by the UN.
As a military strongman and commander of an army that has
received the financial and logistical support of several allies, Haftar is the
only hope Egypt has to secure its western border, which has been quite porous
lately.
Egypt’s stance on Haftar can be compared to that of France,
which reportedly backs him in the hope that his victory will achieve the kind
of stability that would curb the influx of immigrants toward the Northern
Mediterranean. Egypt fears a threat to its national security if Haftar fails to
eradicate Islamist militias, as operatives would continue entering through the
western desert.
With Sudan, the situation is a little different. Bashir and
Egypt have not exactly been on the best terms for several reasons, including
the dispute over the Halayeb Triangle, Sudan’s support for Ethiopia’s
construction of the Renaissance Dam, and Sudan’s close ties with Qatar and
Turkey. Bashir’s government also sympathized with Islamists and provided refuge
to several Muslim Brotherhood members who fled from Egypt following the ouster
of President Mohamed Morsi.
But the protests seem to have brought the two countries
closer. Egypt has openly declared that it prioritizes Sudan’s stability and
supports the will of the Sudanese people.
For Egypt, it makes no difference who is in charge, whether
Defense Minister and former Vice President Awad Ibn Auf, who toppled Bashir, or
Bashir’s de facto successor Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Bourhan. Either
way, having the military in power is in Egypt’s best interests. Not only will
the southern border be secured, and the threat of immigrants flocking
northwards in case of civil strife eliminated, but bilateral relations will
also take a different turn.
Earlier reports of the expulsion of Muslim Brotherhood
members from Sudan under Bashir had already signaled a possible rapprochement
with Egypt, which can now make its backing of the post-Bashir government
contingent upon an official anti-Islamist stance and a dissociation from
countries that support the Muslim Brotherhood.
Haftar is expected to be a much closer ally to Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. If he emerges victorious, both would work
together to clamp down on weapons smuggling and extremist militants crossing to
either side. Every chance Haftar stands to stabilize Libya is also a chance for
Egypt to protect itself against terrorist threats.
Through Libya, Egypt can seal off a vital passageway for
armed groups. Through Sudan, which saw Bashir’s now disbanded National Congress
Party as the last standing Islamist stronghold in the region, it can deal a
blow to Bashir’s allies Qatar and Turkey.
If its southern and western neighbors embrace the same view
of stability and adopt the same approach to national security, the Egyptian
government can rest assured that neither protests nor armed struggles will be
exported to its turf.
Egypt’s formula of eliminating Islamists and putting the
military in charge, however, is not easily applicable in Sudan and Libya. The
political complexity and number of warring factions in both countries make the
situation there entirely different.
The parties that have stakes in the Sudanese political scene
are too ferocious to promise a smooth transition. There is no guarantee that
some parties will reach a peaceful understanding as far as the division of
power is concerned. The situation is similarly intricate in Libya, as the fall
of Tripoli to Haftar’s troops will neither give him legitimacy nor secure a
final victory against Islamist militias.
It is hard to predict, therefore, if either country will
achieve full stability in the near future, keeping Egypt’s borders fully
secured.