Rojava: US drawdown makes already impractical ‘safe zone’ unworkable
Fresh proposals for a “safe zone” in the northeast border regions of Syria have once again demonstrated how fundamentally flawed and unworkable the entire project is in practice.
On April 25, the Washington Post reported that the US and Turkey are negotiating joint patrols in the proposed safe zone in northeast Syria, citing unnamed officials in both countries.
“There are still differences of significance, but will on both sides to find solutions,” one US official said, adding that the US is trying to negotiate a smaller safe zone than the initially proposed 20-mile deep area put on the table in December.
These patrols would act as an alternative to earlier failed attempts by Washington to get other states, Britain and France in particular, to deploy forces to bolster the tiny American residual force remaining in Syria and to enforce the euphemistically named safe zone – in reality a buffer between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds.
On March 25, the US Syria envoy James Jeffrey told a press conference that there would be no Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) permitted in the proposed zone.
Al-Monitor, citing unnamed officials, recently reported the US is trying to convince the YPG, and the larger Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance, to permit “a limited number” of Turkish troops into their region.
What the Americans are willing or able to offer the Kurds in return for such an enormous concession remains unclear.
The Wall Street Journal recently revealed how the US has tried and failed to get sufficient support from allied countries for post-Islamic State (ISIS) stabilization efforts and its proposed safe zone as it moves to withdraw the majority of its troops from Syria.
“Many only intended to take part in the effort to eliminate Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate, not the post-caliphate aftermath,” the WSJ noted, citing US officials involved in these outreach efforts. “Others have awaited more specifics from the US about long-range plans for Syria.”
Reports suggesting the US plans to keep approximately 1,000 troops in the country after the draw-down are “factually incorrect,” Gen. Joseph F. Dunsford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a statement on March 17.
“There has been no change to the plan announced in February and we continue to implement the President’s direction to draw down US forces to a residual presence,” he said.
The plan announced by the Trump administration in February would see the US keep just 400 troops in Syria.
Of this paltry number, less than half are likely to remain in the northeast. A senior Trump administration official clarified in February that 200 troops would remain in the northeast while the other 200 would remain in the Al-Tanf base in southern Syria.
Syria envoy Jeffrey also said such a residual force would be tasked with combating ISIS remnants, “not to operate safe zones.”
It is unclear whether this token troop presence will remain active in the Manbij region on the west bank of the Euphrates River. Either way, this would be a ludicrously small force for potentially patrolling more than 200 miles of border region with Turkey.
Analysts have already highlighted how such a paper-thin troop presence covering such a large area will leave US forces much more vulnerable to security threats and more dependent on the SDF as their “eyes and ears”.
Without a deployment of more allied troops in the coming months, Washington may have to fundamentally revise its current draw-down plan and seriously consider retaining the majority of its deployed troops if it really wants to shape events on the ground.
With a growing dependence on the SDF/YPG in order to operate in northeast Syria, it is unclear how the US can successfully convince the group to essentially permit a Turkish troop presence there. After all, the initially proposed 20-mile zone encompasses all of Syrian Kurdistan’s major cities, including the region’s capital Qamishlo.
Although the US has already said the YPG will not have any presence in this zone, it is unclear whether an exception will be made for Arab units in the SDF, which Ankara will no doubt wish to thoroughly vet, to bolster their patrol force in lieu of other allied troops.
The Manbij Roadmap, the only precedent of joint US-Turkey patrols being used to successfully prevent Turkey clashing with the SDF/YPG in that area, has made little overall progress toward a long-term settlement since its introduction last summer. The roadmap also never entailed the YPG vacating any part of the Syrian Kurdish heartland in order to placate Turkey.
Even if Washington can somehow convince or compel the SDF/YPG to accept a plan for a much smaller buffer zone with a Turkish presence, it is still unclear how this could lead to a successful and sustainable long-term solution.
Last fall, US troops were patrolling Syria’s northern border in a clear effort to deter Turkish cross-border artillery attacks against the YPG. The YPG has a good overall track record of not attacking or even seriously provoking Turkey. Despite this, they have been bombarded multiple times by the Turkish military. Turkey also invaded and occupied its northwestern Afrin enclave.
Five months since it was first proposed, the “safe zone” idea remains unsubstantiated and, by all appearances, impractical.